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Abstract 
The aim of paper is to determine whether macroeconomic development and the size of 
banking sector affect the range of external funding and consequently the importance of these 
debt sources for microfinance performance. Our findings reveal that the growth of external 
sources is positively influenced by economic grow, level of corruption, unemployment or 
under certain conditions by the development of banking sector, as well. Likewise, their 
presence can have a positive impact on the number of clients, portfolio quality, margin or cost 
policy of MFIs. The opposite effect can appear if the ratio of external funding to total assets  
increases over time. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Microfinance is considered to be a useful instrument for support of the low-income 
inhabitants in the developing countries. The client portfolio of the microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) consists mainly of the inhabitants who want to increase their living standards by 
means of investment in their own businesses, education of their children or to overcome 
unfavourable incidents in the period of floods, crop failure or the job loss of one of the family 
members. Due to their growing demand for microfinance credits and commercialization of the 
microfinance sector, it has began to broaden the primary way of the MFIs financing by means 
of the public expenditures on the private capital from the commercial banks, institutional and 
private investors in the last decades. The reason for the growing interest from the side of 
private sector consists in the possibility to reach relatively high profit, comparable with other 
debt instruments and in the possibility to diversify the investment portfolio appropriately 
(Janda et al., forthcoming). 
The majority of the existing studies focusing on the development of the microfinance 
sector or the research of the efficiency of the individual sources of finance is based on the 
micro-level analysis without taking the causal relations in the broader macroeconomic 
context. The lack of macroeconomic studies in the microfinance literature prevents from more 
complex argument of the possible causes of the enormous growth of the microfinance market 
size and the number and size of the microfinance service providers. The general public 
believe that the microfinance development is the merit of the growing client number, gradual 
reduction of operating expenditures and interest rates, establishment of new technologies or 
more quality legislative conditions enabling greater transparency of the microfinance 
industry. We are lacking more complex assessment whether this success can also be 
significantly influenced by the environment where the MFIs work. 
Minority of the studies that take into consideration the importance of the macroeconomic 
environment shows that, generally, the development of the microfinance is influenced 
positively by the economic growth, density of the population and higher rate of the activities 
related to the agricultural production in the given area. The MFIs working in these areas excel 
in the higher number of offered credits and higher efficiency of the operating expenditures. 
On the contrary, there can be slower development of the microfinance market in the places 
with higher percentage of the industrial production, insufficient legislation and high inflation 
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rate. Slower development is also observed in the developed countries where Schreiner and 
Woller (2003) see the main cause in the smaller market for the beginning micro-entrepreneurs 
who are usually oriented on the services rather than on the production. 
Insufficient attention of the microfinance literature is also paid to the detailed analysis of 
the particular ways of the MFIs financing. The MFIs use, besides the social capital in the form 
of donations or special purpose subsidies, their own capital or disposable resources gained 
from the client deposits for their business activities. The external sources are the last 
financing option where we cannot find more detailed study examining its impact on the social 
and financial efficiency of the MFIs. Ghosh and Van Tassel (2011), and Ghosh and Van 
Tassel (2013) provide more detailed analysis of the external sources from the viewpoint of the 
competition and the comparison with the other sources. Ghosh and Van Tassel (2011) came to 
the conclusion that increasing competition among the microfinance service providers in 
gaining the external sources leads to higher social efficiency rate. In addition, applicability of 
these sources proves to be more beneficial in the areas with sufficient supply of the sources of 
finance. If the supply is low, the MFIs should be subsidized (Ghosh and Van Tassel, 2013). 
Considering the above mentioned gaps in the literature, the aim of this study is to verify 
whether the macroeconomic environment influences the demand of the MFIs for the external 
sources by its development, and subsequently, whether the MFIs with the application of the 
debt financing reach higher social and financial efficiency rate in the sense of increasing 
number of the debtors, profit rate, decrease of the invested expenditures and risk operations. 
Study will be conducted on the panel data of 539 MFIs working in 21 countries in Latin 
America and Asia in 2007-2012. We will extend the macroeconomic environment represented 
by the indicators GDP, Inflation, Export, Rural population, Public debt, Unemployment, 
Corruption, Currency rate and the Tax burden by the size of the banking sector (total assets 
and the interest rate) which is the biggest creditor of the MFIs in the long term. 
The final conclusions will have the impact on the creditors and investors interested in the 
social and financial efficiency of the microfinance service providers. The macroeconomic 
view will be also useful for more and more popular microfinance funds (MIV) which, besides 
the existing micro-level analysis, will be also able to assess the relevance of the 
macroeconomic development. Last but not least, it is possible to use the final conclusions in 
the frequent discussions between the economists and regulators about the question whether 
the MFIs should use rather their own sources or use the debt financing in their business 
activities. 
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The rest of the study is divided as follows. The next two sections summarize the overview 
of the existing literature focusing on the forms of sources of finance and the importance of the 
macroeconomic environment for the development of the banking sector and the microfinance 
market. Section 4 characterizes the selected panel data that determine this study more closely. 
The panel regression and its more detailed specification is given in Section 5. The final 
conclusions are argued in Section 6. The research findings are summarized in the conclusion. 
 
 
2. The Influence of the Macroeconomic Environment and the Banking Sector on 
the External Sources of the MFIs 
 
The demand of the microfinance service providers for the external sources has not been 
subjected to more detailed analysis from the point of view of the macroeconomic 
development and the size of the banking sector so far. This research intention follows some of 
the existing studies examining a similar topic in the banking sector. According to these 
studies, the activities of the banking institutions are influenced considerably by the stability 
and the size of the internal and external sources of finance (Bucher et al., 2013) as well as by 
the macroeconomic environment of each country (Love et al., 2014). Sehrish et al. (2011) 
revealed higher profit rate at the banking institutions which are characterized by bigger assets 
and higher percentage of  sources of finance. Smaller banks rely on the disposable resources 
from the client deposits while the big and fast-growing banks prefer non-deposit (external) 
sources gained from capital markets (Demirgüç-kunt et al., 2010). 
More detailed analysis of the banking sector balance shows (Bankscope) that 100 biggest 
banks in the region of Latin America (measured by the asset size) held in their liabilities 
approximately 55.4 billion USD in the short-term (SS) and 188.9 billion USD in the long-
term sources (LS) in 2002. The liability side of these institutions increased in the case of the 
SS up to 245.2 billion USD as well as in the case of the LS up to 1.419 billion USD in year 
2012. Similar scenario is also played out  in the USA where 100 biggest commercial banks 
financed their business activities SS/LS in the amount of 4.033/2.783 billion USD in 2002. 
On the other hand, the bank balance on the liability side changed at the SS to 3.805 billion 
USD and at the LS to 10.290 billion USD in 2012. The decrease of the SS is caused by the 
financial crisis in 2008 and the unfavourable economic development. The more are these 
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institutions depending on the financing through capital markets, the higher is the probability 
of higher risk in case of the market shocks (Demirgüç-kunt et al., 2010). 
The decrease of the demand of the banking institutions for the external sources in the 
period of the financial crisis indicates that the interest of the banking sector in financing the 
business activities by the debt sources can be strongly related to the macroeconomic 
development in the given country. The relation between the macroeconomic environment and 
the banking sector was studied by Makri et al. (2014), Bilal et al. (2013), Pouw et al. (2013) 
and Bekö and Festić (2008). The final conclusions show that the activities of the banking 
sector are strongly related to the economic cycle (Makri et al., 2014) and its profitability is 
increasing significantly in the period of the growing GDP (Bilal et al. 2013; Pouw et al. 
2013). The depreciation of the domestic currency (Bekö and Festić; 2008), growing 
government debt, inflation rate and unemployment rate (Pouw et al. 2013; Makri et al., 2014) 
have a negative influence on the development of the banking sector. Then, Anum and Abdul 
(2012) reveal that the amount of import and export in the given country does not have any 
impact on the profitability of the banking sector. At the same time, the amount of the import 
and export can have crucial role in the GDP growth in the open economics. 
In the first part of our study exploring the demand of the MFIs for the external sources 
with taking into consideration the environment where these institutions work, we will proceed 
from the similar conclusions that were discovered in the banking sector. Although the 
commercial banks are the biggest creditors of the MFIs in the long term (see following 
section), we will not limit the size of the external sources only to the banking sector but we 
will consider every possible counter-party, such as government and international 
organizations, institutional or private investors. Similarly, we will take into account some 
macroeconomic factors which have an influence on the development of the banking sector 
where we can assume similar impact on the size of the demand for the external sources from 
the side of MFIs. Besides the GDP, Inflation, Currency rate, Unemployment, Public debt and 
Export, we will broaden the list of the explaining variables with the Company tax, the Rural 
population proportion and the Corruption rate in the given country. 
We can expect, hand in hand with the GDP growth, the consumption and investment 
growth, hence the growing demand of the poor for microcredits and also growing demand of 
the MFIs for the external sources. On the contrary, the size of the demand can be influenced 
negatively by the inflation growth that decreases the real profitability of the client credit, 
increases the expenditures on the credit and increases the size of the debtor’s repayment and 
also the probability of the overdue credit in the long term credits. Similarly, we assume that 
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many credits can be offered to these institutions in the foreign currency (usually in USD) and 
the debt instruments are more expensive and less popular with the MFIs themselves due to the 
depreciation of the domestic currency. The demand for the external sources can be pushed 
positively by year-on-year unemployment growth. The number of the population without the 
job can increase their motivation to establish their own entrepreneurship and also the growth 
of the demand for the microcredits and need of their financing. The size of the government 
debt represents also an important factor influencing the price of the debt instruments. The 
government is an important (and sometimes the only) creditor of many MFIs in some 
countries.  Along with the growth of the government debt, we can expect the decrease of the 
supply of the debt sources on the market and the growth of their price, either due to the 
decreasing supply or higher risk of the country that is perceived negatively by the investors 
and the creditors. This problem can be related closely to the openness of the economics which 
can neutralize the decreasing supply of the public sources on the market with more private 
external counter-parties. The dependence of the MFIs on the external sources can be related to 
the demographic viewpoint. The reason is the fact that the MFIs usually operate in the rural 
regions where the demand for the microfinance and for the external sources can be 
considerably depending on the size of the population and an entrepreneurial environment. The 
size of the demand for these sources can also depend on the corruption rate in the given 
country. The majority of the MFIs works in the developing countries where along with the 
bigger corruption can come about also the decrease of the supply of the external sources, 
higher prices and lower interest from the side of the MFIs. 
Agenor et al. (2000), or Bilson et al. (2001) point out in their studies the possible 
influence of the macroeconomic factors on the explaining variables with a certain time delay. 
It is not possible to exclude that the demand of the MFIs for the external sources in the case of 
the condition change will be shown with a certain time delay due to the fact that they are 
usually financed from more sources (subsidies, client contributions, governments...). 
Although Wagner and Winkler (2013) state that the MFIs which are connected with the 
market more and their sources are more susceptible to the market shocks, many MFIs are not 
able to depend exclusively on the external sources similarly as the banks because of the small 
asset size and a local place of their operation. We think it would be useful to find out whether 
the demand for these sources is, in the case of a change on the side of the creditor or 
conditions on the market, reflected by the MFIs immediately or with a certain time delay. If it 
turns out that the external sources react to the explaining variable with a longer time delay, it 
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is difficult for the MFIs to react flexibly to these changes, e.g. by means of long term loans on 
the money market or with higher interest rate for the clients. 
 
 
3. The Influence of the External Sources and the Macroeconomic Environment 
on the Microfinance Development 
 
Financing of the business activities of the MFIs in comparison with the banking sector is 
rather different in some ways. While the banking institutions are characterized by the 
“problem-free” way of self-financing, there prevails a high dependence on the subsidies by 
the microfinance service providers in many regions (Nawaz, 2010; Caudill et al., 2009). 
Bogan (2012) states that there are mainly the regulated MFIs financed from the market in the 
region of Latin America and the Caribbean, in the states of Africa, East Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) there are mainly non-regulated MFIs 
and NGOs with the business activities interconnected strongly with the subsidy policy on the 
local or international level. 
It is not a natural thing for the MFIs to use their own sources in the form of client deposits 
for their business activities. Even though the demand for the microfinance services surpasses 
the supply in the long term, the MFIs are not subordinated in many cases to any regulation 
and supervision and cannot accept the client deposits. The reasons are mainly the minimal 
requirements on the liquidity and additional expenditures connected with the higher level of 
information obligation in the relation to the regulator. On the other hand, the MFIs financed 
by these sources reach better results in the credit providing and they are more oriented on the 
social aims in the long term than if they relied only on the subsidies (Hollis and Sweetman, 
1998). Last but not least, the special purpose self-financing by the means of deposits reduces 
the effect of the unfair competition between the MFIs that receive subsidies and that do not 
receive subsidies. 
The last option of financing consists in the possibility of borrowing the sources of finance 
from the external counter-parties, usually in the form of standard, current account or 
conditioned credit. This way of the debt financing has been extended to the possibility of 
gaining disposable resources on the capital markets in the form of subscription, bond or 
securitization in the last years. While the banking institutions have usually the access to the 
capital markets, it is still rather marginal thing at the microfinance market. The reason is the 
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small average size of the MFIs and from it emerges the small demanded capacity of the 
sources, low degree of transparency and higher risk of the developing countries that can 
become evident in the price of the debt instruments. 
Similarly as in the case of the banking sector, the popularity of the external sources 
(borrowings, overdrafts, bonds, subordinated debts and others) has been increasing recently at 
the MFIs. The biggest demand from the side of the microfinance service providers is noted in 
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia 
(Table 1). The banking sector proves to be the most important creditor in this case. The 
financial institutions (Commercial Banks, Cooperative Societies, and Public Banks) hold 
almost 40 % of all external sources of the MFIs which is about 33 billion USD for the period 
2007-2012 (mixmarket.org). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: General Overview of Funding Structure (2007-2012) 
Region 
Profit 
status 
Total Amount 
(USD)* 
Number 
of MFIs 
Number 
in % 
Average 
Number of 
MFIs** 
Latin America and The Caribbean  Non-profit 13 526 715 929 239 97.95 244 
Latin America and The Caribbean  Profit 22 128 228 418 138 93.24 148 
Africa Non-profit 1 355 869 498 119 77.78 153 
Africa Profit 3 031 331 005 83 64.34 129 
East Asia and the Pacific Non-profit 1 141 731 014 79 103.95 76 
East Asia and the Pacific Profit 3 657 541 533 82 115.49 71 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Non-profit 3 623 309 835 107 83.59 128 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Profit 13 651 953 184 94 72.87 129 
Middle East and North Africa Non-profit 3 710 128 554 49 94.23 52 
Middle East and North Africa Profit 0 0 0.00 4 
South Asia Non-profit 5 422 212 549 142 122.41 116 
South Asia Profit 11 515 325 278 100 120.48 83 
Note: * It includes Bonds, Borrowings, Overdrafts, Subordinated Debts and Others. ** Profit and Non-profit 
MFIs, unidentified institutions have been removed. 
Source: It was elaborated on the basis of data from mixmarket.org. 
 
More detailed analysis of the counterparties in each region reveals increased interest in the 
microfinance markets from the side of the institutional investors (Funds). Microfinance funds 
that are oriented on the region LAC (Table 2) have been representing frequent investment for 
the investors in the last years enabling to diversify the investment portfolio appropriately and 
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reach an interesting return (Galema et al., 2011). The most distinctive decrease in the external 
sources came between 2008-2009 when the Private Corporations, Individuals, NGOs and 
Foundations (Others) decreased their credit exposure by 24 %. 
 
Table 2:  Funding Structure in Latin America and the Caribbean (2007-2012) 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
DFI Financial Institution Fund Government Other
 
Source: It was elaborated on the basis of data from mixmarket.org. 
 
Similarly, the increased interest in the external sources is shown in the region EAP (Table 3). 
The creditors as Private Corporations, Individuals, NGOs and Foundations have had very 
important role here. Their share represents 86 % of the total invested sum in 2012 which is 
approximately 1.5 billion USD. The financial exposure is decreasing at the Financial 
institutions and institutions classified as the Government (Multi and Bilateral Development 
Agencies, Development Programs, Government Agencies/Programs and Domestic Central 
Bank). It is mainly due to the financial crisis and the necessity to reduce the size of the 
investment credits and public expenditures on the social programs. 
 
Table 3:  Funding Structure in East Asia and the Pacific (2007-2012) 
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 Source: It was elaborated on the basis of data from mixmarket.org. 
The countries of South Asia are the only regions where the debt sources have been decreasing 
in the long term (Table 4). Primarily between 2011-2012 ( in 2012 the fall was by 86 %). The 
reason was the microfinance crisis in India “The Andhra Pradesh Crisis” in 2010. This 
country is the biggest receiver of the external sources in the given region, hence the decrease 
in the business activities of the local MFIs can lead to the decrease in the demand for the 
external sources. Ghosh and Van Tassel (2013) came in their study to the conclusion that it is 
more profitable for the creditor to provide the external sources (credits) in the period of a 
higher supply of these sources on the market. On the contrary, if the supply of the sources is 
low on the market, it is more efficient to finance the MFIs by subsidies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Funding Structure in South Asia (2007-2012) 
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 Source: It was elaborated on the basis of data from mixmarket.org. 
 
Although the banking institutions represent an important source of the MFIs financing, their 
joined activity on the market does not have any definite conclusion for the microfinance 
sector. Cull et al. (forthcoming) and Vanroose and D´Espallier (2013) believe that the MFIs 
have a chance for faster progress in the branches where the banking sector is not developed 
very well. Furthermore, bigger competition among the MFIs for the external sources leads to 
higher level of social efficiency and poverty decrease (Ghosh and Van Tassel, 2011). On the 
other hand, Sodokin and Donou-Adonsou (2010) and Knight et al. (2009) support the mutual 
cooperation between the commercial banks and the microfinance service providers. It is still 
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an open question, whether the banking sector can influence the demand for the external 
sources by its policy in the given country, or what impact it could have on the chosen 
indicators of the microfinance sector. 
Besides the satisfactory access to the sources of finance, there are some authors convinced 
that the different development of the microfinance industry in each region can be influenced 
also by the environment where the MFIs act (Vanroose, 2008; Ahlin et al., 2011). Ahlin et al. 
(2011) found out that the microfinance development is influenced positively by the economic 
growth. The MFIs reach higher profitability rate and bigger size of the credit portfolio in the 
region where GDP grows faster. Khandker (2005) states that the MFIs can help to reduce 
poverty but their impact on the economic growth is rather local. Rhyne (2001) comes to the 
conclusion that the stable macroeconomic environment with lower inflation rate influences 
positively the growth of the microfinance service providers. According to Montgomery and 
Weiss (2011) and Berhane and Gardebroek (2011) higher efficiency of the MFIs is in the 
rural areas and regions with higher percentage of the agricultural production. Finally, Bond 
(2013) found out in his study that instable political environment and high indebtedness rate of 
the country slow down the development of the MFIs. 
From the above mentioned, it is clear that although the external financing can be an 
efficient instrument for solving of the lack of sources in the microfinance sector in the long 
term, existing studies focusing on the microfinance are significantly limited in their 
conclusions. We cannot find more complex study which would confirm the fact that 
enormous development of the microfinance is the merit of the subsidies and its own sources 
or also of more costly form of the external financing. At the same time, the external sources 
have had an upward trend recently with the growing number of the MFIs. To answer this 
question, it proves to be very important to take into consideration the environment where the 
MFIs act. We have reduced the extent of macroeconomic variables to indicators GDP, 
Inflation, Rural population and Unemployment. Considering the fact that many microfinance 
service providers are not oriented on the external sources because of their position on the 
market and the size of their assets, we will also examine the importance of the change of the 
impact of the explaining variables on the microfinance development while taking into 
consideration the time and the size of the banking sector. 
It is necessary to see, unlike to the banking sector, not only the financial indicators but 
also the indicators of the social efficiency behind the microfinance expansion. When 
determining the subject of the research, we follow the general assumption that the external 
sources are associated with high expenditures in comparison with other possibilities of 
 12 
financing that these institutions want to take into consideration in the higher price possible for 
the offered services. The reason of high expenditures that limit more extent using of the 
external sources is the insufficient supply on the market, low transparency of the MFIs, higher 
potential risk related to the aim segment and last but not least, the size of the MFIs that limits 
the negotiating ability with the counterparty and makes the MFIs the “price-taker”. We will 
examine the applicability of these sources in the relation to the social efficiency where the 
growing expenditures can push the MFIs to the preference of the more solvent debtors and to 
the increasing of the interest rates. It is the impact on the profitability and invested 
expenditures from the point of view of the financial efficiency. The separate field will be the 
risk operations because the increased expenditures on the debt financing can lead to the 
lowered aversion to risk and to preference of more risky debtors from the side of the 
microfinance service providers. 
 
 
4. Data 
 
The data used in this study are from several sources. The first source is the database 
mixmarket.org (MIX) that gathers the current information about the MFIs. Specifically, we 
are focusing on the countries in Latin America and Asia; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Vietnam. The chosen localities are characterized by the high number of the MFIs and 
relatively high capacity of the external sources of finance. We distinguish for each state 
whether the final sum belongs to the profitable or non-profitable MFIs. We will estimate our 
regressive model on the data from the period of 2007-2012 because MIX has been gathering 
the required data about the financial exposure since 2007. Individual descriptive statistics of 
our data are captured in the Table 5. 
The first subject group represents the size of the external sources (EF_ln) and the 
proportion of these sources to the total assets of the MFIs (EF/TA). MIX lists under the name 
external sources borrowings, overdrafts, bonds, subordinated debts and others. The second 
group shows the indicator of the proportion of the risk credits where the clients are due date 
by more than 30 days (PAR_30) or 90 days (PAR_90). There is a high probability that the 
client will not repay his credit. In this case the MFIs must write off the losing credits from 
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their portfolios (Write-off). The third group consists of the indicators of the profitability of the 
MFIs from the performed business activities. Specifically, it is the real profit from the credit 
portfolio (Yield_R), the size of the profit margin (Margin) and the rentability of the assets 
(ROA). The data in the next group, that represent the development of the number of the credit 
clients (Num_ln), the size of the credit portfolio to the total assets (GLP/TA) and the 
percentage of the women in the credit portfolio (Female), are chosen as the indicators of the 
social efficiency. The indicators of the invested expenditures are the separate group. There we 
are interested mainly in the proportion of the total expenditures to the total assets (TE/TA) 
where the total expenditures are counted by the addition of the financial and the operating 
expenditures. We set aside the operating expenditures as a separate item due to the fact that 
the MFIs have high percentage of the manual laboriousness at their business activities 
(OE/TA). We will consider similarly the indicator of the expenditures on the employee 
salaries (PE/TA). The last indicator shows the average size of the offered credits on one 
debtor (ALB_ln). 
Table 5. General Description of Microfinance Variables 
     MFIs (Profit) MFIs (Non-Profit) 
ID General Description Obs. Mean Std.dev. Obs. Mean Std.dev. 
EF_ln Sum of External Funds (abs.) 90 18.782 1.285 101 17.937 1.559 
EF/TA External Funds/Total Assets  (%) 90 26.555 14.616 101 34.384 20.949 
PAR_30 Portfolio at Risk  > 30 days (%) 90 5.192 3.982 101 4.627 3.226 
PAR_90 Portfolio at Risk  >  90 days (%) 90 3.257 2.473 101 3.048 2.571 
Write-off Write Offs/Gross Loan Portfolio (%) 90 1.597 1.525 101 1.259 0.978 
Yield_R Real Yield on Gross Portfolio (%) 90 23.638 14.786 101 22.283 12.312 
Margin Profit Margin (%) 90 8.005 13.776 101 10.298 9.224 
ROA Return on Assets (%) 90 1.309 3.349 101 2.331 2.224 
Num_ln Number of Active Borrowers  (abs.) 90 9.343 1.604 101 8.482 1.498 
GLP/TA Gross Loan Portfolio/Total Assets (%) 90 77.455 9.111 101 80.120 7.777 
Female Number of Active Women Borrowers  / 
Number of Active Borrowers (%) 
90 62.798 21.852 101 75.233 19.020 
TE/TA Total Expense/Total Assets (%) 90 24.797 12.534 101 25.264 14.032 
PE/TA Personnel Expense/Total Assets (%) 90 8.863 5.386 101 10.630 7.519 
OE/TA Operating Expense/Total Assets (%)  90 16.175 9.831 101 17.987 13.701 
ALB_ln Average Loan Balance per Borrower (abs.) 90 6.478 1.016 101 5.913 1.034 
Source: mixmarket.org 
 
The macroeconomic data for the each country (Table 6) are from the database of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Specifically, it is the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), Inflation (Infl), Export (Export), Rural population (Rural), the Government debt 
(Debt) and Unemployment rate (Unemp). The score published by organization Transparency 
International is used as an indicator of the corruption rate (Legal). It is a point assessment of 
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the given country in the range from 0 to 10 where 0 is big corruption and 10 shows non-
corrupted environment. The next figure is the year-on-year change of the real currency rate 
(Er) counted on the bases of the nominal currency rates from the server oanda.com. The 
currency rates for individual countries are considered to USD because the size of the external 
sources is shown in this currency. In the countries with USD as a domestic currency is the real 
rate counted as a quotient of the price levels of the foreign and domestic economics. The last 
macroeconomic figure shows the size of the company tax (Tax) adopted from the web pages 
of the Deloitte company. We will use this indicator as a proxy indicator showing the 
conditions of the business development in the given country. 
The banking sector represents the last subject group where we consider the indicator of 
the Net Interest Margin (NIM) that will be used for estimation of the impact of the 
development of the commercial bank’s interest policy to the MFIs and TA_ln depicting the 
size of the total assets of the banking industry in the chosen areas. Both indicators are adopted 
from the server Bankscope and their descriptive statistics are also in the Table 6. 
Table 6: General Description of Macroeconomic Variables and Banking Industry 
    MFIs (Profit) MFIs (Non-Profit) 
ID General Description Obs. Mean Std.dev. Obs. Mean Std.dev. 
GDP Gross Domestic Product (% change)  90 4.730 2.791 101 4.798 2.550 
Infl Inflation (% change) 90 6.635 3.519 101 6.973 3.352 
Export Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) 90 29.410 12.925 101 28.997 14.521 
Rural Rural Population (% of total population) 90 47.333 23.259 101 45.564 21.341 
Debt General Government Gross Debt (% of GDP) 90 43.333 16.431 101 43.503 16.851 
Unemp Unemployment (% of total labor force) 90 7.109 1.921 101 6.852 2.222 
Legal Degree of Corruption between 10 (highly clean) 
and 0 (highly corrupt) 
90 2.916 0.554 101 3.039 0.697 
Er Real Exchange Rate (% change) 90 -0.002 0.015 101 -0.002 0.015 
Tax Corporate Tax Rate (%) 90 28.756 4.358 101 27.946 6.807 
NIM Net Interest Margin (%) 90 421.760 731.490 101 535.380 795.390 
TA_ln Total Assets of Banking Sector (abs.) 90 11.052 1.921 101 11.259 1.688 
Source: World Bank, IMF, Transparency International, Oanda, Deloitte and Bankscope 
 
 
5. Methodology and Hypotheses 
 
The aim of the first part of this study is to verify whether the macroeconomic environment 
creates quality conditions for the growth of the external sources, meaning the efficient supply 
and demand between the counterparties involved. Let us have the first hypothesis saying that 
the macroeconomic factors and banking environment influence the size of the external 
sources of financing of the MFIs. At the same time, the regressive model introduced in the 
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equation 1.1 determines the level of the external sources of financing EF_ln in year t and in 
the country c as a dependent variable and the independent variables are: GDP, Infl, Export, 
Rural, Debt, Unemp, Legal, Er, Tax, NIM and TA_ln. 
 
EF_lntc= α0 + β1GDPtc + β2Infltc + β3Exporttc + β4Ruraltc + β5Debttc + β6Unemptc + β7Legaltc 
+ β8Ertc + β9Taxtc + β10NIMtc + β11TA_lntc + εtc.     (1.1) 
 
Similarly, we consider the equation 1.2 where the size of the external sources to the size of 
the assets of the MFIs (EF/TA) in year t and the country c is used as a dependent variable. The 
reason why we modify the dependent variable from the equation 1.1 is that we can compare 
the relative size of the external sources to the size of the microfinance markets with its ratio to 
the total assets. 
 
EF/TAtc= α0 + β1GDPtc + β2Infltc + β3Exporttc + β4Ruraltc + β5Debttc + β6Unemptc + β7Legaltc 
+ β8Ertc + β9Taxtc + β10NIMtc + β11ln TAtc + εtc.     (1.2) 
 
We will change the regressive equation on the right side of factor of a year delay t-l in the 
next step (1.3, 1.4). A summarizing overview of the independent variables and their 
correlation rates are presented in the Table 7. Since there are mainly the macroeconomic 
indicators where we can assume a mutual influence, we verified the problem of the 
multicollinearity by the method Variance Inflation Factor1. The resulting figures did not 
surpass the general coefficient 10 at any of the explaining variable (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009), hence the multicollinearity was not proved.  
 
EF_lntc= α0 + β1GDPt-1c + β2Inflt-1c + β3Exportt-1c + β4Ruralt-1c + β5Debtt-1c + β6Unempt-1c + 
β7Legalt-1c + β8Ert-1c + β9Taxt-1c + β10NIMt-1c + β11ln TAt-1c + εt-1c.                     (1.3) 
 
EF/TAtc= α0 + β1GDPt-1c + β2Inflt-1c + β3Exportt-1c + β4Ruralt-1c + β5Debtt-1c + β6Unempt-1c + 
β7Legalt-1c + β8Ert-1c + β9Taxt-1c + β10NIMt-1c + β11ln TAt-1c + εt-1c.   (1.4) 
 
Other hypotheses will focus on the research of the influence of the external sources on the 
chosen indicators of the microfinance sector where we reduce the macroeconomic variables 
                                                 
1 VIFj = 1/1-Rj2; where Rj2 is adjusted determination coefficient  
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on the GDP, Infl, Rural and Unemp. Let us consider another hypothesis: The external sources 
of finance influence the risk operations of the MFIs. The indicators PR_30, PR_90 and Write-
off will be the explaining variable Y in time t and the country c in the equation 1.5 and in the 
equation 1.6. When we are choosing the explaining variable we proceed from more detailed 
analysis of the indicators of the risk operations of the MFIs where their growth is reached in 
the observed period, which was probably caused by the financial crisis and higher repayment 
inability of the debtors. Generally, there is an effort to reduce these operations, e.g. by means 
of the credit registers following the bonus of the debtor or by appropriate business strategy 
aimed to women (Janda and Turbat, 2013). 
 
Ytc= α0 + β1EF_lntc + β2EF_TAtc + β3GDPtc + β4Infltc + β5Ruraltc + β6Unemptc + β7 NIMtc +  
β8TA_lntc + εtc.               (1.5) 
 
Ytc= α0 + β1EF_lnt-1c + β2EF_TAt-1c + β3GDPt-1c + β4Inflt-1c + β5Ruralt-1c + β6Unempt-1c + β7 
NIMt-1c + β8TA_lnt-1c + εt-1c.          (1.6) 
 
Similarly, let us have the third hypothesis: The external sources of finance do not influence 
the profitability rate of the MFIs where the indicators Yield_R, Margin and ROA are the 
explaining variable Ytc in the equation 1.5 and 1.6. We are proceeding from the long term 
decrease of these indicators caused by the possible growing competition on the market and by 
the pressure on the decrease of the interest rates. If it turns out that the growth of the external 
sources leads to the decrease of the profitability, it can show a certain inefficiency that would 
prove right the supporters of the self-financing of the MFIs. 
 
Table 7: Correlation Matrix 1 
MFIs (Profit) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(0) GDP 1           
(1) Infl 0.155 1          
(2) Export 0.086 -0.165 1         
(3) Rural 0.199 0.336 0.052 1        
(4) Debt -0.073 0.318 -0.331 0.039 1       
(5) Unemp -0.035 0.098 -0.448 -0.160 0.189 1      
(6) Legal -0.013 -0.237 -0.391 -0.423 0.140 -0.020 1     
(7) Er -0.113 0.220 0.107 0.191 0.178 -0.047 -0.148 1    
(8) Tax 0.098 0.203 -0.575 -0.238 0.500 0.192 0.334 -0.108 1   
(9) NIM 0.028 -0.041 -0.279 -0.433 0.230 -0.012 0.414 -0.166 0.401 1  
(10) TA_ln 0.122 -0.067 -0.527 -0.405 0.278 -0.019 0.538 -0.294 0.582 0.599 1 
MFIs (Non-Profit) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(0) GDP 1              
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(1) Infl 0.102 1             
(2) Export 0.087 0.075 1            
(3) Rural 0.090 0.360 0.055 1           
(4) Debt 0.011 0.302 -0.149 0.051 1          
(5) Unemp -0.026 -0.015 -0.368 -0.305 0.241 1         
(6) Legal -0.072 -0.193 -0.026 -0.432 -0.026 0.087 1        
(7) Er -0.069 0.273 0.121 0.189 0.235 -0.091 -0.162 1       
(8) Tax 0.145 0.101 -0.167 -0.214 0.501 0.476 0.103 -0.027 1     
(9) NIM -0.034 -0.131 -0.299 -0.532 0.288 0.075 0.414 -0.066 0.294 1   
(10) TA_ln 0.232 -0.116 -0.304 -0.290 0.336 0.101 0.317 -0.244 0.381 0.664 1 
 
 
We will gradually substitute the indicators Num_ln, GLP/TA and Female on the left side of 
the equation 1.5 and 1.6 for the explaining variable Ytc to examine the social efficiency. It is 
valid for all dependent variables, besides the female proportion in the credit portfolio, that 
there is a distinct growing trend in the observed period. The importance of the microfinance 
for the low income inhabitants was also confirmed several times, e.g. Khandker (2005). 
Therefore, we believe that a big merit in this can have the long term growth of the debt 
services. Let us define another hypothesis: The external sources influence the social efficiency 
of the MFIs. 
The aim of the last hypothesis is to verify the importance of the external sources from the 
point of view of the invested expenditures. Let us define a hypothesis: The external sources of 
finance influence the financial efficiency of the MFIs when we substitute the chosen 
indicators TE/TA, PE/TA, OE/TA and ALB_ln for the explaining variable Ytc into the equations 
1.5 and 1.6. Finally, we attach the correlative relations among the given explaining variables 
in the Table 8. Similarly as in the previous case, the VIF method did not confirm the 
multicollinearity problem among the variables. 
 
Table 8: Correlation Matrix 2 
MFIs (Profit) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(0) EF_ln 1               
(1) EF_TA 0.235 1             
(2) GDP 0.067 -0.030 1           
(3) Infl -0.218 0.245 0.156 1         
(4) Rural -0.176 0.072 0.199 0.337 1       
(5) Unemp 0.037 0.165 -0.035 0.098 -0.159 1     
(6) NIM -0.062 -0.004 0.028 -0.041 -0.433 -0.012 1   
(7) TA_ln 0.198 0.038 0.122 -0.067 -0.405 -0.019 0.599 1 
MFIs (Non-Profit) (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(0) EF_ln 1               
(1) EF_TA 0.196 1             
(2) GDP -0.000 -0.082 1           
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(3) Infl -0.167 0.206 0.102 1         
(4) Rural -0.097 -0.021 0.090 0.359 1       
(5) Unemp 0.099 0.115 -0.026 -0.015 -0.305 1     
(6) NIM 0.113 0.126 -0.031 -0.131 -0.532 0.075 1   
(7) TA_ln 0.174 -0.007 0.232 -0.116 -0.289 0.101 0.664 1 
 
 
6. Final Results 
 
We have tested the influence of the chosen factors on the size of the provided external sources 
of finance (Table 9) in time t and t-l with the difference between the profit and non-profit 
MFIs on the above mentioned representative sample of data (with the help of application 
Gretl) by the regressive model with the fixed robust effects (FE) and random effects (RE). 
Then, we examined the influence of the chosen explaining variables from the equations 1.5 
and 1.6 on the chosen indicators of the microfinance sector with the difference whether they 
are the profit (Table 10) or non-profit MFIs (Table 11). We have verified the choice of the 
applicable model by Hausman test. If the p-value of the Hausman test surpasses significant 
level 0.05, it is possible to use the method with random effects for each searching of the 
applicable model. In the opposite case, we have used the fixed effects method. 
 
Factors Influencing the External Sources of the MFIs 
 
The macroeconomic environment proves to be an important factor for the external financing, 
mainly in the case of the profit MFIs where we assume bigger connection to the market, 
hence higher susceptibility to the exogenous forces (Table 10). The demand for the debt 
sources is growing with the economic growth in the given country, growing unemployment 
rate, corruption rate, and growing national debt. If we consider only the oversize expenditures 
of the country on the consumption and investments, such an increase is usually related to 
higher demand of the poor for the credits and also for the external sources. Similar scenario 
can happen on the side of the supply when the country provides more favourable credits to 
MFIs thanks to its expansive/social policy. Negative influence is related to the growth of the 
company tax, economic openness and inflation rate that can increase the total sum of the 
external sources artificially. 
The size of the banking sector is also important because its growing asset rate and interest 
rate lead significantly to the growth of the demand for the external sources (EF_ln). While the 
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growth of the banking assets (TA_ln) is related to the growth of the external sources (EF_ln), 
it leads to the decrease of the demand for the debt financing in the long term in comparison to 
the total size of the microfinance sector (EF/TA). The reason is that the size of the banking 
sector makes the debt sources more affordable and in demand for the MFIs. The growing 
share in liabilities of the microfinance service providers leads to the higher rate of profitability 
(see below), but the MFIs can reduce these sources and substitute them with their own 
cheaper sources of finance with a certain time delay. 
 
The Importance of the External Sources and other Chosen Variables for the Microfinance 
Development 
 
The aim of the panel regression was to analyse the impact of the debt financing on the risk 
operations, profitability rate, the size of the invested expenditures and social efficiency. We 
can say from the analysis of the results in the Tables 10-11 that the size of the risk operations 
is influenced positively by the external sources only in the case of the profit MFIs. The 
additional 1% growth of the size of the external sources (EF_ln) leads to the decrease of the 
classified credit rate by 1.12 and 0.63 percentage point on the 5% level of statistical 
significance. On the contrary, the non-profit MFIs prove to be less aversive to the risk and 
their activities can become evident in the growth of the risk credit rate with a certain time 
delay (PAR_90). We can see a certain threat in the case of growing proportion of the debt 
sources to the total size of the microfinance market (EF/TA). The uncontrolled financing can 
lead to the growing number of the overdue credits and to a higher rate of the written-off 
credits (Write-off) at the both types of the MFIs. This case can occur mainly in the regions 
where the sufficient conditions for the development of the microfinance sector are not present 
or the market is facing some negative incidents. 
Financing of the business activity by the foreign capital proves to be more efficient from 
the point of view of the profitability at the profit MFIs. The growth of the debt financing is 
related not only to the growth of the assets profitability (ROA) but can also be shown in the 
size of the profit margin (Margin) from the microfinance services. The payback period and 
the size of the microfinance market have also an important role. The year-on-year 1% growth 
of the external source increases the size of the profit margin by 4.33 percent point on average. 
At the same time, the results show that the same year-on-year change is present in the 
decrease of the profit margin by 4.04 percent point on average with the time factor taken into 
consideration (t-l). We think that the reason is growing competition on the market that can 
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push the margin rate down in the long term. Similarly, the MFIs are not able to ensure in the 
short term that the financial expenditures are lower than the financial profit in the region 
where the microfinance market is stagnating or is developing slowly (we assume that the 
financial expenditures and profits relate to the borrowing and lending money). Here also 
comes the growth of the profit margin (Margin) with the growth of the proportion of the debt 
sources to the total size of the microfinance market (EF/TA) with a certain time delay. 
The profitability of the debt sources depends on the size of the microfinance market for 
the non-profit MFIs. The year-on-year growth of the external sources by 1% decreases the 
real profit from the credit portfolio (Yield_R) by 3.22 percent point on average. If the 
proportion of the external sources to the total size of the microfinance market (EF/TA) grows, 
it will cause the opposite effect. It can cause not only the growth of the risk credits discussed 
above, but also higher profitability from the provided credits. It is necessary to mention that 
the indicator Yield_R is perceived as a proxy indicator of the interest rate on clients in some 
studies (Janda and Zetek, 2014). In this case it would be beneficial for the investors to allocate 
the debt sources in the non-profit MFIs working in more developed regions where the 
decrease of the interest rate on a client leads to higher level of the social efficiency. 
The impact of the external sources on the invested expenditures has also a positive 
influence. There is not only a decrease of the total expenditures but also of the operating 
expenditures and expenditures on an employee under the influence of the debt financing 
(EF_ln). It shows that there are no significant additional expenditures for the MFIs or they are 
not misused on the growth of the client worker’s salaries or manager’s salaries. The negative 
effect is brought about again with the proportion of the external sources to the total size of the 
microfinance market (EF/TA). The insufficient demand for the microfinance services, more 
precisely credits, can have negative influence on, besides the risk credits and profit rate, the 
growth of the expenditures of both, profit and non-profit MFIs. 
It is worth noting the indicator of the average credit size (ALB_ln) that we perceive as an 
ability of the MFIs to reduce the average expenditures for one credit to minimum. Since these 
institutions provide their services mainly to the poor, the low credit capacity is usually related 
to high expenditures per unit. The result of the panel regression shows that the additional 10% 
growth of the external sources (EF_ln) is shown by the decrease of the average size of the 
credit by 1.4 % at the profit MFIs. On the other hand, the same year-on-year change EF_ln 
leads to the growth of the average size of the credit by 1.8 % at the non-profit MFIs. Some 
economists (Mersland and Strøm; 2010) argue this indicator also in the relation to the analysis 
of the social efficiency. Generally, it is true that higher rate of this indicator can be related to 
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the decrease of the social efficiency, because the MFIs prefer more bonus clients to the core 
poor. In this case, the external sources should be offered primarily to the profit MFIs where 
the additional growth of the external sources is shown by the decrease of the average size of 
the microcredit on a borrower. 
The last examined area is the impact on the social efficiency. In the case of 10% growth of 
the debt sources (EF_ln), the number of the active debtors (Num_ln) increases on average by 
6.4 % at the profit and by 2.4 % on the 1% level of the statistical importance, by the 2.4 % on 
the 5% level of the statistical importance at the non-profit MFIs. While the usage of the debt 
sources leads to the increase in the percentage of women in the credit portfolio (Female) at 
the profit MFIs, at the non-profit institutions it leads to the increase of the size of the credit 
portfolio (GLP/TA). If we consider the indicator of the proportion of the external sources to 
the total size of the microfinance market, then, its additional growth can mean not only the 
decrease of the clients number for the microfinance service providers but it can also be 
represented negatively by the decrease of the size of the credit portfolio with a certain time 
delay. The legislators who emphasize the social efficiency of the MFIs should adjust 
appropriately the control mechanisms in a way that does not allow the uncontrolled debt 
financing in the places with insufficient demand for the microfinance services and conditions 
for the development of the microfinance sector. 
 
GDP 
 
The results show that the MFIs working in the places with faster economic growth have better 
conditions for their future development. For one thing, this growth influences significantly the 
demand for the credits (GLP/TA), the profit margin rate (Margin), or the return of the assets 
(ROA), but it also significantly decreases the percentage of the classified and written-off 
credits in the register of the MFIs. Besides the growth of the women proportion in the credit 
portfolios and the decrease of the total rate of the invested expenditures, there can be also the 
decrease in the credit rates on clients at the profit MFIs. It results from our findings that the 
economic growth has bigger importance for the development of the microfinance rather than 
way of financing by the external sources. 
 
Inflation 
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The influence of the growing price level is a negative factor as was pointed out by Ahlin et al. 
(2011). According to their findings, the growth of the average interest rate and expenditures 
on financing go hand in hand with the growing inflation. We reveal that the unexpected 
growth of the price level can influence “immediately” the development of the indicators, 
mainly at the profit MFIs. From this point of view, we are talking about the growing size of 
the portfolio and decrease in the number of the overdue credits. The long term effect 
represents for the microfinance market a certain level of risk in the form of significant 
decrease in assets return (ROA), profit margin (Margin) and the real profit from the portfolio 
(Yield_R). The payment morale of the debtors is getting worse and there are more overdue 
credits with higher inflation. Last but not least, the inflation rate is mirrored in the credit price 
and in the decrease of the size of the credit portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
Rural Population and Unemployment 
 
Recently, many studies have been trying to find out whether it is better to work in the rural 
areas for the MFIs (Berhane and Gardebroek, 2011) or whether it is better to focus on the 
urban areas where the conditions for the development can be much more favourable (Bashar 
and Rashid, 2012). Although the addition of the variable Rural into the panel regression did 
not confirm the influence on the size of the external sources, its development seems to have a 
positive influence on the social efficiency, size of the invested expenditures and the 
proportion of the risk operations of the MFIs. Surprisingly, the improvement of the 
profitability of the MFIs does not occur with the growth of the rural population. We did not 
succeed to prove any impact on the return of the assets or the size of the profit margin. The 
given variable works negatively only in  the size of the real profit from the portfolio that 
decreases with its growth no matter what type of the MFIs it is. We deduce from this fact that 
the MFIs working in the rural areas have a positive impact on the poverty reduction at the cost 
of decreasing financial efficiency rate. 
There is an ambiguous effect in the case of an unemployment rate (Unemp). Similarly as 
in the previous section (Table 9), the number of the unemployed people is not shown anyhow 
in the economics of the non-profit MFIs. For the profit MFIs the additional growth of the 
explaining variable, on a 5% level of importance, is related to 0.29 % growth of ROA and 
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68.8 % decrease in the number of clients having any form of the credit (Num_ln). At the same 
time, it is true that the unemployment policy influences the microfinance market with a 
certain time delay. The final importance for the microfinance will depend on the development 
of the other factors and a time period. 
 
Banking Sector 
 
Growing size of the banking industry (TA_ln) means mainly bigger opportunity of 
profitability for the microfinance market that shows itself in the growth of the real profit of 
portfolio, profit margin rate or assets return. Faster economic growth of the given country, 
pushed by the banking sector, can cause the area-wide pressure on the salary growth not only 
in the microfinance sector. Purchasing power of the inhabitants is represented in some MFIs 
by the decrease of the risk credits or by the effort of the institutions to offer higher average 
capacity of the credit (ALB_ln). Our study did not definitely confirm that the banking sector 
represents a threat by means of decrease of the number of clients of the MFIs. Although the 
explaining variable influences negatively the number of the clients at profit MFIs, this 
decrease proves to be insignificant and can be compensated by the effort to offer higher 
capacity of credits (see above). The opposite effect is at the non-profit institutions where the 
client growth can be significantly related to the decrease of the indicator ALB_ln after some 
time. A certain financial insufficiency is rather favourable for the clients from the point of 
view of the social efficiency. 
If we have a look on the banking interest rates, we find out that their growth influences the 
level of the invested expenditures of the MFIs, but at the same time, it is not shown in the 
profitability rate. The growth of the input prices can be mirrored in the attempt to prefer the 
debtors with higher probability of the return of the provided credit (Female). 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to find out whether the growing demand for the external sources is 
influenced positively by the macroeconomic environment and by the size of the banking 
sector which is the biggest creditor of the MFIs. Afterwards, the study examined the impact of 
the growing demand for these sources on the risk operations, social efficiency, profitability 
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rate and expenditure optimization of the MFIs. The performed research of the period 2007-
2012 was applied on the chosen countries of Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean where is 
the biggest demand for the debt financing from the MFIs. 
Our results show that the demand for the external sources is strongly depending on the 
environment where the MFIs work. Higher rate of interconnection to the macroeconomic 
development is more at the profit MFIs which are more exposed to the market conditions and 
special purpose financing. The growing demand of the MFIs for the external sources is 
positively influenced by the economic growth, growing unemployment rate, size of the 
banking sector and corruption index. Growing tax burden rate and price level have a negative 
and important impact on the debt sources. It has been revealed for both types of the 
institutions that the growth of the public debt of the country leads to the growing proportion 
of the external sources to the total assets rate (EF/TA) which can be dangerous in the future 
for the microfinance sector from the point of view of the market shocks. 
We have also revealed that the external sources are not suitable as an individual source of 
finance but rather as a complement to the existing sources of finance. In the areas where the 
microfinance market depends strongly on the external sources and where the sufficient 
conditions for the assets growth are not fulfilled, the growing proportion EF/TA mirrors 
negatively in the growth of risk operations, invested expenditures, or in the case of the profit 
MFIs in the decrease of the social efficiency. Our research of the impact on the indicators of 
the financial efficiency did not come to any definite conclusion. While the immediate impact 
of the debt sources (EF_ln) on these variables indicate the growing profitability rate, we side 
more to their decrease in the long term. We recommend performing another research which 
would focus more on the contribution of these sources from the financial side. We also 
recommend to the government institutions to regulate or control more the access to these 
sources to prevent the decrease of the social efficiency and slower development of the 
microfinance sector. 
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Table 9: Macroeconomic Environment, Banking Sector and External Funds 
  
MFIs (Profit) MFIs (Non-Profit) 
EF_ln EF/TA EF_ln EF/TA EF_ln EF/TA EF_ln EF/TA 
REt REt REt-1 FEt-1 REt REt REt-1 REt-1 
Const. 15.832*** 79.871** 17.514*** 20.771 16.076*** 52.722 20.617*** 75.034** 
  (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.828) (0.000) (0.179) (0.000) (0.040) 
GDP -0.011 0.178 0.057*** 0.845 -0.037 -0.091 -0.014 0.428 
  (0.625) (0.726) (0.009) (0.164) (0.327) (0.898) (0.652) (0.527) 
Infl 0.045*** 0.727* 0.007 0.097 0.029 0.701 0.008 -0.051 
  (0.007) (0.067) (0.675) (0.804) (0.325) (0.229) (0.769) (0.929) 
Export -0.004 -0.369 -0.027 -0.452 -0.012 -0.250 -0.022 -0.436* 
  (0.824) (0.177) (0.113) (0.298) (0.596) (0.359) (0.309) (0.098) 
Rural 0.006 -0.089 0.002 1.663 0.008 0.049 0.019 0.043 
  (0.721) (0.539) (0.901) (0.352) (0.716) (0.820) (0.428) (0.839) 
Debt 0.012 0.353** -0.004 0.105 0.019 0.386* 0.0002 0.507** 
  (0.169) (0.019) (0.765) (0.666) (0.160) (0.071) (0.989) (0.027) 
Unemp 0.094 0.561 0.189*** 3.896*** -0.049 -0.258 -0.008 -1.267 
  (0.126) (0.649) (0.005) (0.002) (0.581) (0.862) (0.924) (0.403) 
Legal -0.283 -4.541 0.393 11.760 0.123 7.229 -0.162 9.712* 
  (0.268) (0.332) (0.192) (0.106) (0.732) (0.152) (0.659) (0.051) 
Er 0.484 -28.661 3.663 -32.452 -1.535 -157.776 2.585 141.489 
  (0.884) (0.723) (0.278) (0.761) (0.794) (0.171) (0.649) (0.563) 
Tax -0.118*** -1.542** -0.052 -0.402 -0.039 -0.657 0.015 -0.358 
  (0.000) (0.011) (0.123) (0.251) (0.419) (0.283) (0.787) (0.169) 
NIM 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.001 0.001** 0.008 0.002*** 0.009 
  (0.229) (0.869) (0.524) (0.783) (0.025) (0.179) (0.001) (0.169) 
TA_ln 0.484*** -0.518 0.078 -11.056*** 0.119 -3.688 -0.322 -5.928** 
  (0.001) (0.792) (0.581) (0.001) (0.580) (0.178) (0.156) (0.030) 
R2  0.286 0.176 0.829  0.245 0.305 0.555 
Hausman 
test 
0.134 0.094 0.162 0.0002 0.681 0.699 0.171 0.209 
 Note: p-statistics are provided in parentheses below coefficient estimates; *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10,  5, 1 % level. 
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Table 10: Final Results for Microfinance Performance (Profit-MFIs) 
  PAR_30 PAR_90 Write-off 
  REt REt-1 REt REt-1 REt REt-1 
Const.  24.146** 17.679 17.579*** 11.123 1.707 -0.414 
  (0.010) (0.113) (0.003) (0.102) (0.638) (0.918) 
EF_ln -1.121** -0.523 -0.629** -0.141 0.072 0.173 
  (0.019) (0.359) (0.033) (0.679) (0.697) (0.400) 
EF/TA 0.048 0.067** 0.0002 0.035 0.0008 0.022* 
  (0.103) (0.038) (0.991) (0.113) (0.949) (0.084) 
GDP -0.322*** -0.310*** -0.255*** -0.293*** -0.089* -0.088* 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.072) (0.073) 
Infl -0.177* 0.201** -0.199*** 0.109 -0.039 0.091** 
  (0.078) (0.041) (0.007) (0.133) (0.353) (0.026) 
Rural -0.011 -0.049 -0.001 -0.035 -0.015 -0.032** 
  (0.751) (0.279) (0.961) (0.148) (0.242) (0.036) 
Unemp 0.081 -0.388 0.099 -0.198 0.089 0.010 
  (0.759) (0.226) (0.559) (0.333) (0.402) (0.932) 
NIM 0.0005 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.001* -0.0001 
  (0.529) (0.912) (0.419) (0.567) (0.099) (0.856) 
TA_ln 0.289 0.068 -0.080 -0.236 -0.087 -0.047 
  (0.502) (0.901) (0.752) (0.433) (0.597) (0.798) 
R2  0.338 0.221  0.325   0.349 0.203 0.447 
Hausman test 0.369 0.089 0.922 0.146 0.053 0.756 
Note: p-statistics are provided in parentheses below coefficient estimates; *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10,  5, 1 % level. 
 
  Yield_R Margin ROA 
  REt REt-1 REt FEt-1 FEt FEt-1 
Const. 59.706*** 12.281 -68.969** 12.260 -15.072 -11.176 
  (0.005) (0.567) (0.039) (0.851) (0.473) (0.499) 
EF_ln -1.346 -0.412 4.324** -4.041** 1.111* -0.558 
  (0.240) (0.721) (0.013) (0.019) (0.064) (0.169) 
EF/TA 0.079 0.097* -0.233** 0.185*** -0.047 0.023 
  (0.145) (0.077) (0.021) (0.003) (0.241) (0.174) 
GDP -0.168 -0.378** 0.757** 0.718*** 0.235** 0.118*** 
  (0.356) (0.036) (0.045) (0.002) (0.046) (0.009) 
Infl -0.469*** 0.127 0.009 -0.696*** 0.022 -0.138*** 
  (0.004) (0.397) (0.979) (0.004) (0.790) (0.009) 
Rural -0.296** -0.276** 0.169 -0.161 0.046 0.189 
  (0.026) (0.032) (0.235) (0.869) (0.891) (0.408) 
Unemp 0.377 -0.101 -0.183 0.265 0.016 0.285** 
  (0.441) (0.856) (0.838) (0.595) (0.952) (0.037) 
NIM -0.0009 -0.0007 0.002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.572) (0.693) (0.523) (0.907) (0.831) (0.897) 
TA_ln 0.229 2.796** -0.793 6.847** -0.620 1.064* 
  (0.854) (0.032) (0.625) (0.025) (0.307) (0.062) 
R2  0.278  0.529 0.207  0.861 0.825 0.879 
Hausman test 0.054 0.308 0.121 0.037 0.023 0.031 
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  Num_ln GLP/TA Female 
  REt FEt-1 REt REt-1 REt REt-1 
Const. -0.426 20.855 70.795*** 64.256*** -33.185 -48.534 
  (0.895) (0.365) (0.000) (0.001) (0.415) (0.263) 
EF_ln 0.635*** -0.215 1.249 1.326 4.844** 5.845** 
  (0.000) (0.719) (0.193) (0.179) (0.028) (0.012) 
EF/TA -0.022* 0.022 -0.074 -0.089* 0.019 -0.017 
  (0.080) (0.225) (0.116) (0.074) (0.865) (0.879) 
GDP -0.087 -0.064 0.359** 0.083 0.768* 0.505 
  (0.123) (0.329) (0.027) (0.626) (0.056) (0.215) 
Infl 0.094* -0.013 0.308** -0.274* -0.598* -0.527 
  (0.055) (0.664) (0.028) (0.059) (0.084) (0.124) 
Rural 0.012 -0.031 -0.074 -0.053 0.436** 0.460** 
  (0.276) (0.921) (0.458) (0.562) (0.037) (0.027) 
Unemp 0.049 -0.523** 0.047 0.215 -1.448 -1.289 
  (0.613) (0.026) (0.911) (0.674) (0.163) (0.284) 
NIM 0.0002 -0.002** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.517) (0.034) (0.309) (0.399) (0.787) (0.800) 
TA_ln -0.251* -0.174 -1.454 -0.568 -0.470 -0.921 
  (0.066) (0.789) (0.157) (0.577) (0.833) (0.689) 
R2 0.328 0.638 0.146 0.451 0.376 0.529 
Hausman test 0.194 0.0003 0.355 0.151 0.100 0.469 
 
  TE/TA OE/TA PE/TA ALB_ln 
  REt REt-1 REt REt-1 FEt FEt-1 REt REt-1 
Const. 76.328*** 68.074*** 30.290*** 19.159** 3.968 12.349** 59.620*** 55.546*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.032) (0.467) (0.040) (0.001) (0.000) 
EF_ln -2.729** -1.703 -1.063** -0.318 -0.141* -0.135 -1.933** -1.564** 
  (0.021) (0.131) (0.019) (0.502) (0.068) (0.167) (0.019) (0.025) 
EF/TA 0.156*** 0.093* 0.042** 0.017 -0.0003 0.001 0.098** 0.032 
  (0.008) (0.089) (0.047) (0.440) (0.893) (0.857) (0.011) (0.293) 
GDP -0.415** -0.018 0.012 -0.011 -0.005 -0.014 0.066 -0.007 
  (0.043) (0.918) (0.879) (0.882) (0.789) (0.441) (0.598) (0.935) 
Infl 0.175 0.293* -0.027 -0.010 -0.005 0.015 -0.068 -0.018 
  (0.321) (0.054) (0.661) (0.870) (0.833) (0.379) (0.536) (0.824) 
Rural -0.332*** -0.295** -0.126** -0.122** -0.002 -0.142 -0.267*** -0.221** 
  (0.005) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.977) (0.117) (0.006) (0.016) 
Unemp -0.191 -0.156 -0.158 -0.184 0.013 -0.029 -0.337 -0.063 
  (0.722) (0.778) (0.404) (0.425) (0.619) (0.566) (0.325) (0.839) 
NIM -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 0.0003* 0.00003 -0.002 -0.0003 
  (0.169) (0.557) (0.292) (0.577) (0.085) (0.704) (0.113) (0.767) 
TA_ln 1.301 -0.053 0.442 0.224 0.464** 0.338*** 0.565 -0.003 
  (0.288) (0.965) (0.371) (0.666) (0.013) (0.001) (0.527) (0.997) 
R2 0.427 0.593 0.381 0.539 0.908 0.954 0.396 0.553 
Hausman 
test 
0.554 0.079 0.629 0.209 0.001 0.00002 0.631 0.469 
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Table 11: Final Results for Microfinance Performance (Non-profit-MFIs) 
   PAR_30 PAR_90 Write-off 
  REt REt-1 REt REt-1 REt REt-1 
Const. 15.762*** 14.352** 8.059* 7.216 1.232 4.113* 
  (0.003) (0.014) (0.066) (0.139) (0.514) (0.082) 
EF_ln -0.041 0.271 0.183 0.402* 0.010 -0.008 
  (0.861) (0.339) (0.366) (0.097) (0.908) (0.946) 
EF/TA 0.027* 0.025 0.008 0.013 0.014** 0.003 
  (0.083) (0.200) (0.538) (0.436) (0.014) (0.682) 
GDP -0.383*** -0.156 -0.246*** -0.094 -0.068* -0.069* 
  (0.000) (0.124) (0.004) (0.294) (0.069) (0.071) 
Infl -0.127 0.302*** -0.086 0.212*** 0.016 0.012 
  (0.117) (0.001) (0.234) (0.008) (0.583) (0.719) 
Rural -0.038 -0.096*** -0.019 -0.055** -0.014 -0.010 
  (0.108) (0.001) (0.367) (0.020) (0.108) (0.375) 
Unemp 0.013 -0.155 0.012 -0.107 -0.047 -0.065 
  (0.939) (0.412) (0.930) (0.508) (0.443) (0.395) 
NIM 0.001 0.0006 0.0008 0.0009 0.0001 0.0005 
  (0.331) (0.511) (0.203) (0.270) (0.971) (0.185) 
TA_ln -0.649** -1.042*** -0.578** -0.882*** 0.046 -0.161 
  (0.039) (0.006) (0.031) (0.005) (0.686) (0.289) 
R2  0.434  0.562  0.325 0.486  0.245   0.299 
Hausman test 0.148 0.404 0.094 0.839 0.552 0.456 
Note: p-statistics are provided in parentheses below coefficient estimates; *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10,  5, 1 % level. 
 
 
  Yield_R Margin ROA 
  REt REt-1 REt REt-1 REt REt-1 
Const. 78.666*** 34.266* 0.785 15.602 -3.001 2.935 
  (0.000) (0.052) (0.968) (0.387) (0.523) (0.471) 
EF_ln -3.225*** -2.198** 0.721 -0.124 0.304 0.017 
  (0.000) (0.012) (0.392) (0.889) (0.152) (0.931) 
EF/TA 0.111** 0.113** -0.068 -0.072 -0.017 -0.012 
  (0.017) (0.035) (0.158) (0.228) (0.206) (0.399) 
GDP -0.240 -0.232 0.876*** 0.468 0.207*** 0.145* 
  (0.340) (0.213) (0.002) (0.107) (0.004) (0.057) 
Infl -0.769*** 0.170 0.181 -0.606** 0.091 -0.194*** 
  (0.000) (0.301) (0.422) (0.019) (0.129) (0.004) 
Rural -0.212** -0.409*** -0.026 0.092 -0.016 0.018 
  (0.029) (0.001) (0.789) (0.313) (0.477) (0.359) 
Unemp -0.243 -0.551 -0.721 -0.153 -0.158 -0.107 
  (0.639) (0.256) (0.187) (0.793) (0.267) (0.428) 
NIM 0.005* -0.004 0.0001 0.003 0.001 0.001** 
  (0.062) (0.164) (0.964) (0.357) (0.399) (0.043) 
TA_ln 1.171 4.309*** -0.072 -0.277 0.022 -0.045 
  (0.316) (0.001) (0.952) (0.812) (0.940) (0.861) 
R2  0.535 0.616   0.138  0.466 0.139  0.503  
Hausman test 0.559 0.592 0.240 0.177 0.323 0.276 
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  Num_ln GLP/TA Female 
  REt REt-1 REt REt-1 FEt FEt-1 
Const. 1.561 1.687 54.599*** 48.370*** 96.767 118.217* 
  (0.529) (0.558) (0.001) (0.005) (0.289) (0.069) 
EF_ln 0.236** 0.174 0.529 1.809** -1.705 -2.307* 
  (0.042) (0.226) (0.425) (0.024) (0.238) (0.051) 
EF/TA -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 -0.098* 0.147* -0.008 
  (0.556) (0.305) (0.771) (0.053) (0.063) (0.935) 
GDP -0.009 -0.002 0.292 0.199 0.199 -0.094 
  (0.867) (0.979) (0.123) (0.309) (0.518) (0.738) 
Infl 0.025 -0.018 0.154 -0.261 0.073 0.161 
  (0.589) (0.729) (0.328) (0.136) (0.625) (0.313) 
Rural 0.019 0.029** 0.004 0.088 0.416 0.486 
  (0.104) (0.031) (0.965) (0.378) (0.776) (0.602) 
Unemp -0.112 0.037 -0.046 0.266 -0.318 -0.187 
  (0.177) (0.698) (0.909) (0.580) (0.661) (0.759) 
NIM -0.001 -0.0003 -0.001 0.001 0.013** 0.025** 
  (0.110) (0.468) (0.545) (0.624) (0.025) (0.019) 
TA_ln 0.265* 0.252 1.266 -0.197 -1.879 -3.152 
  (0.076) (0.165) (0.211) (0.859) (0.534) (0.342) 
R2 0.259 0.464 0.106 0.454 0.933 0.957 
Hausman test 0.164 0.962 0.309 0.962 0.009 0.0001 
 
 
  TE/TA OE/TA PE/TA ALB_ln 
  REt REt-1 REt REt-1 REt REt-1 REt REt-1 
Const. 60.941*** 63.394*** 25.516*** 24.739*** 9.177*** 6.474*** 57.644*** 42.999*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.009) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.007) 
EF_ln -2.056*** -2.260*** -1.027*** -1.164** 0.053 0.189** -2.245*** -1.490** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.012) (0.439) (0.023) (0.000) (0.048) 
EF/TA 0.086** 0.063 0.068*** 0.029 -0.009** -0.008 0.108*** 0.048 
  (0.012) (0.107) (0.001) (0.271) (0.036) (0.302) (0.001) (0.272) 
GDP -0.093 0.277** -0.089 0.191** 0.035 -0.007 -0.049 0.326** 
  (0.588) (0.021) (0.359) (0.031) (0.223) (0.820) (0.749) (0.020) 
Infl 0.163 0.137 -0.012 -0.012 -0.034 -0.008 0.030 0.009 
  (0.258) (0.194) (0.886) (0.878) (0.152) (0.783) (0.817) (0.943) 
Rural -0.289** -0.395*** -0.185*** -0.187** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.299*** -0.389*** 
  (0.011) (0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.004) 
Unemp 0.043 -0.009 -0.309 -0.203 0.048 0.090 0.023 -0.189 
  (0.911) (0.978) (0.159) (0.393) (0.321) (0.104) (0.948) (0.621) 
NIM 0.005** 0.0003 0.00004 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.003* -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.879) (0.969) (0.886) (0.498) (0.608) (0.065) (0.578) 
TA_ln 0.698 1.518 1.105* 1.391* -0.260*** -0.274*** 0.785 1.693 
  (0.504) (0.162) (0.064) (0.053) (0.005) (0.010) (0.423) (0.156) 
R2 0.501 0.575 0.484 0.578 0.531 0.637 0.509 0.520 
Hausman 
test 
0.432 0.443 0.368 0.568 0.116 0.196 0.439 0.227 
 
 
 
 
